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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES1 
1. Does Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah 
render unconstitutional a municipal council's legislative 
decision to occasionally have an opening ceremony before its 
legislative sessions that includes the Pledge of Allegiance to 
the Flag and a "thought/reading/invocation", when that ceremony 
frequently results in a prayer to a God, but where any such 
presentation: (a) is voluntary; (b) without payment to the 
presenter; (c) non-proselytizing; (d) non-coercive; (e) involves 
discretionary attendance/participation; (f) involves all cultures 
and philosophies in a non-discriminatory manner; and, (g) has 
numerous identified secular legislative purposes? 
2. Is the Order enjoining the individual elected 
legislators of Salt Lake City from encouraging, supporting or 
allowing "prayers" at City Council meetings so vague, ambiguous, 
over-broad and over-inclusive as to violate: (a) the Council 
Member's rights of free expression guaranteed by the U.S. and 
Utah Constitutions; (b) their "speech and debate" immunity 
xIn their Docketing Statement the Council Members also 
raised as an issue the lower court's failure to strike an 
affidavit of the Separationistsf proposed "expert" witness in 
part because the affidavit expressed philosophical and legal 
conclusions instead of facts. Recognizing that this Court will 
decide this issue as a matter of law, and because of space 
limitations, the Council Members will not brief the Whisner 
Affidavit but will rely, instead, on their Memorandum below. R. 
623-7 and 1038-41. 
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privilege as elected legislators; and, (c) Rule 65A(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Is the legislative action of adopting (by resolution) 
the Council's internal policy regarding opening ceremonies, 
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity, which 
challengers have the burden to overcome by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
4. Did the lower court err in awarding a declaratory, 
injunctive and monetary judgment against two elected legislators 
concerning a City Council policy that they voted against and 
thereby holding them vicariously liable for the political 
decision of other independently elected City officials? 
5. Did the lower court err in ruling that the individual 
City Council Members are answerable, personally, and not just as 
representatives of the City and its legislative branch of 
government? 
6. Are the individual elected Council Members of a Utah 
First Class City, which operates under the optional Council-Mayor 
form of government, absolutely immune from personal liability for 
their legislative decisions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case was decided below as an interpretation of Utah 
constitutional law made on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
Thus, there are no material issues of fact. The Supreme Court 
review is based solely on the law, with no deference afforded to 
the lower court decision. Further, the legislative act of the 
.2 
City Council in establishing their internal policy is entitled to 
a presumption of validity. Mt. States Tel, v. Garfield Co., 811 
P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AT ISSUE 
The Preamble, Article I, Section 4 and Article III are 
provided with this Brief as Attachment No. 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For 72 years, the Salt Lake City Council (the legislative 
body of Salt Lake City) has had an internal policy that provides 
an opening ceremony for its legislative sessions. This ceremony 
occasionally includes a prayer or invocation. These 
presentations are made by individuals or groups representing the 
broad spectrum of diversity in philosophical and religious 
points-of-view in the community. The opening ceremony policy 
dates from 1851. 
The plaintiff-appellees (collectively referred to in this 
brief as the "Separationists") objected to the Opening Ceremony 
"prayer" in 1991 and filed an action in the Third District Court 
asserting that this practice violated Article I, Section 4 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick heard the cross-motions for 
summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Separationists and denied summary judgment requested by the 
defendants-appellants (except where it may be otherwise 
appropriate the defendants below will be referred to as the "City 
Council Members"). The trial court subsequently denied the City 
3 
Council Members' motion for clarification of the Memorandum 
Decision and objection to the Separationistsf proposed Order. 
The court below also failed to quash the affidavit of an "expert" 
witness submitted by the Separationists. 
The City Council Members and the City Council appeal the 
ruling below that bars the Council's opening ceremony which 
includes an invocation. The City Council and four Council 
Members (Whitehead, Hardman, Kirk and Hale) assert that, in 
addition to an improper construction of Article I Section 4, the 
lower court ruling violates their rights of free expression both 
as citizens and as elected officials. It also violates their 
speech and debate immunity privileges guaranteed under the Utah 
and the U.S. Constitution. Two Council Members (Pace and 
Godfrey), who had voted against continuing the invocation opening 
ceremony practice, appeal only the order and monetary judgment 
against them individually. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undisputed material facts are as follows: 
1. The area now known as Utah was first permanently settled 
in July 1847 by a religious people fleeing persecution. 
Following Utahfs connection to the United States of America, the 
legislative branches of virtually all government bodies with 
jurisdiction over the area, have included invocations as part of 
opening ceremonies of their legislative sessions. 
A. Territorial Legislature. 
2. The Legislature of the Territory of Deseret (Utah) 
4 
routinely commenced its sessions with a prayer or invocation. 
The records of the first seven sessions of the Territorial 
Legislature, beginning in 1850, cannot be found in the State 
Archives-2 The first Journals which are preserved in the 
Archives begin on Monday, December 15, 1858. On this day, and 
throughout the following session, prayers were offered before the 
proceedings began.3 
B. Salt Lake City. 
3. Salt Lake City was incorporated some 45 years before 
Utah became a state, following the adoption of an ordinance by 
the Territorial Legislature on January 9, 1851. Then known as 
"Great Salt Lake City", the City was established under the 
"federal model" with a strong executive (mayor) elected at large 
and an 11 member City Council representing legislative districts. 
This City Council legislative body met for the first time on 
January 11, 1851. Two days later, on January 13, 1851, it began 
a longstanding practice of commencing its sessions with an 
opening ceremony which included a prayer. (Exhibit "F"; R. 366.) 
4. The City has remained in continuous existence from 1851 
to the present and the State's Constitution expressly recognizes 
it as the State's capital. (Utah Constitution Article XXII, 
Section 3.) 
2Record notation from the State Archives attached and 
incorporated as Exhibit "C" to the City Council Members' 
Memorandum below. R. 355-6. Exhibits submitted to the District 
Court will be referred to in this Brief as "Exhibit ' '; R. . ,f 
3Copies of the handwritten Journal entries, Exhibit "D"; R. 
357-8. 
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5. Except for a period between 1911 and 1980 when the State 
legislature mandated that Utah cities adopt a commission form of 
government (which merged the executive and legislcitive 
functions), Salt Lake City has operated under this federal 
model.4 
6. In 1980 (pursuant to §10-3-1201, et seq., U.C.A.), the 
electorate of Salt Lake City adopted the Council-Strong Mayor 
form of government. This form of government strictly separates 
the executive and legislative functions. The executive functions 
are carried out solely by the Mayor, while the legislative 
functions are reserved to the City Council. §10-3-1209, U.C.A.; 
Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
7. The City Council consists of seven CounciL Members, each 
representing geographic districts of roughly equal population. 
(Exhibit "H"; R. 400-4.) Following is 1980 creation, the Council 
began holding regular evening legislative meetings to give 
greater public access to its proceedings. (Exhibit "I"; R. 405-
20. ) 
8. At its first meeting on January 8, 1980, the City 
Council decided to open the meeting with a ceremony which 
included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer. From January 15, 
1980 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City Council 
reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered at the 
4See Compiled Laws of Utah, 107 Section 182, as amended by 
Chapter 125, Laws of Utah, 1911; Larsen v. Salt Lake City, 44 
Utah 437, 141 P. 98 (1914); Section 10-3-1709 U.C.A.; Section 
2.06.010, .020 and .060, Salt Lake City Code, Exhibit "H"; R. 
400-4. 
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beginning of each weekly legislative meeting, (Exhibit "I"; R. 
405-20. ) 
9. In a letter dated September 23, 1987, Assistant City 
Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council 
that, pursuant to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed. 2d 
1019 (1983), opening ceremonies including prayerful invocations 
were constitutionally permissible. Montgomery also attached a 
"Suggestion Sheet" to be given to those offering prayers, 
emphasizing that any such invocation must be non-denominational 
and non-proselytizing nature. (Exhibit "J"; R. 421-3.) 
10. Opening ceremony prayers were suspended for a few 
months in the Spring of 1988 while the Council debated continuing 
the practice. On May 17, 1988, the City Council re-instituted 
the practice of including prayers as part of the opening 
ceremonies of some Council meetings. (Exhibit "I", R. 405-20.) 
Pursuant to the Council's purposeful policy of including all 
points-of-view in the community, a wide variety of prayers, 
invocations and thoughts have been offered before the City 
Council meetings. This diversity is illustrated by a list of 
opening ceremony providers for Fiscal Year 1990: Scientologists, 
Bahafi, Greek Orthodox, Eckankarists, police chaplains and 
ordinary citizens have all participated. These opening thoughts 
have included "Christian"-type prayers, non-"Christian" prayers, 
thoughts and simple moments of silence. (Exhibit "K"; R. 424-8.) 
11. Following a letter in 1991 from the SeparationistsT 
attorney that questioned the Council's practice of allowing 
7 
Opening Ceremony "prayers", the Council sought to clarify and 
formalize its policies. The Council preliminarily discussed 
adopting a formal clarification by written policy modifications. 
(Exhibit "L"; R. 429-31.) These discussions occurred prior to 
the filing of this suit. (Exhibit "L"; R. 424-31.) 
12. On September 26, 1991, and prior to their adoption, 
these draft documents were transmitted to the Separationists' 
attorney for comment by him or his clients. No response was 
received. (Exhibit "M"; R. 432-3.) 
13. The Council adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy on 
October 17, 1991, by a five-two vote. Tom Godfrey and Nancy Pace 
voted against the policy and against continuing the 
"thought/reading/invocation" practice. (Exhibit "N"; R. 434-43.) 
14. The formally adopted Council Policy provides that the 
Council will hear various "thoughts, readings and invocations" 
prior to beginning certain legislative sessions, as part of an 
Opening Ceremony which includes the Pledge of Allegiance to the 
Flag.5 
15. The Policy further specifies that these "thoughts, 
readings and invocations" are offered for a number of secular 
purposes. These include: (a) creating a moment during which the 
Council Members and the audience can reflect on the business 
before the Council; (b) promotion of an atmosphere of civility; 
(c) encouragement of lofty thought and high-mindedness; (d) 
5Exhibit "0"; R. 444-7. A copy of the Policy is provided as 
Attachment 1 to this Brief. 
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recognition of cultural diversity; and (e) fostering sensitivity 
for and recognition of the uniqueness of all segments of our 
community. (Attachment 1.) 
16. Without dictating the content of any "thought, reading 
or invocation", the Council Policy expresses a preference for 
non-denominational and non-proselytizing Opening Ceremony 
presentation. Id. 
17. The Council Policy also provides that traditional 
patriotic documents may be read or songs such as The Star 
Spangled Banner, Utah We Love Thee and others may be performed. 
The lyrics to these songs all include references to "God". 
(Exhibit "P"; R. 488-52.) 
18. Presentation of the Opening Ceremony is coordinated by 
the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain who makes an effort to obtain 
a wide variety of representation from various religious and other 
philosophical affiliations. Additionally, The Policy provides 
that, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain can make arrangements 
to give their own Opening Ceremony presentation. The presenters 
are not compensated in any way, nor is there any other direct 
expenditure of City monies or properties. (Attachment 1.) 
19. Legislative and business matters before the Council are 
conducted in conformity with the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act, including the posting of an agenda that lists the matters to 
be discussed and their order. (§52-4-1, U.C.A.) These notices 
generally include a schedule with particular starting times. 
(Note the references to hearing times on Exhibit "I"; R. 405-20.) 
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Thus, any member of the audience at a Council Meeting is not 
required to be in the room during the Opening Cere^mony. The 
audience member could simply choose the enter the Council 
Chambers at the time of the scheduled matter of interest• 
20. With the brief exception discussed in Fact No, 10 above 
during which time the Council was reconsidering its policy, this 
separate and co-equal legislative body of the City has opened its 
meetings with a ceremony which included a prayer or invocation. 
This practice of beginning Council legislative sessions with 
opening ceremonies including prayer has been in existence for a 
combined period of approximately 72 years, dating to 1851. 
C. Constitutional Convention. 
21. In 1894, after a long struggle and after several 
attempts by Utah for admission to the Union had been rejected,6 
the United States Congress passed an Enabling Act setting forth 
the terms under which the United States would consider the 
acceptance of Utah as a state. Statutes at Large, 53rd Congress, 
Chapter 138, p. 107.7 The first requirement found in Section 3 
of the Enabling Act is that the Constitution proposed for Utah 
6Utah's three prior attempts to join the United States had 
been rejected by Congress. (For a thorough and interesting 
discussion of Utah's admission to the Union see Hickman, Utah 
Constitutional Law, Doctoral Thesis, University of Utah, 1954, 
pp. 40-79. Relevant excerpts from Hickman were attached as 
Appendix "1" to the Council Members* Memorandum below; R. 233-
71. ) 
7The full text of the Enabling Act is set out in the 
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 
1985 ("Proceedings"), pp. 3-8; R. 272-76. Copies of all relevant 
pages of the Proceedings cited below were provided as Exhibit "A" 
to the Council Members' Memorandum; R. 272-352. 
.10 
must ensure: 
That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be 
secured, . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
22. On March 4, 1895, as commanded by the Enabling Act, 
delegates from across Utah convened for Utah's final 
Constitutional Convention. The Convention was opened with a 
prayer offered by President George Q. Cannon of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. (Proceedings, p.9; R. 278.) 
Over the next 66 days the delegates had 55 public business 
meetings. On 54 of those days prayers were offered.8 At least 
31 assorted ministers, reverends and elders representing at least 
14 different religious congregations gave prayers. Two military 
chaplains, a lieutenant from the Salvation Army and 18 different 
delegates also led the Convention in prayer. Among the different 
churches represented in prayer were Presbyterians, Lutherans, 
Swedish Lutherans, Congregationalists, Mormons, Unitarians, 
Baptists, African Methodist Episcopalians, Scandinavian Methodist 
Episcopalians, Methodist Episcopalians and the just plain vanilla 
Episcopalians. (Exhibit "B"; R. 353-4.) 
23. The Convention made it clear that the wide variety of 
religious faiths and other sentiments represented in their daily 
opening prayers was representative of the diverse beliefs of the 
community and the Convention's spirit of religious tolerance and 
freedom: 
8There is no explanation in the Proceedings as to why there 
was no prayer given on Day 60 of the Convention, May 2, 1895. 
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MR. CANNON: Mr. President, I move the name of the 
church of which the reverend gentleman offering prayer 
is a member be inserted after his name, and I would 
like to request that this be done in each case since 
the opening of the Convention. I find by reference to 
our minutes of the first day, the name of the gentleman 
who offered prayer and also the church with which he is 
associated was given, and I think this should be done 
in each case, the object of the mover of the motion 
having been to show to the public that a freedom of 
religious sentiment prevailed in the Convention. 
Proceedings, p. 105; R. 285. (Emphasis added.) 
24. The Conventions' discussion of what would ultimately 
become Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah is exceedingly brief. The sentence at issue in the instant 
case was introduced almost exactly as it reads today. 
(Proceedings, p. 230; R. 294.) 
25. Utah's Article I, Section 4 was drawn virtually 
verbatim from the Constitution of the State of Washington. (R. 
214.) Similar to Utah's history, the Washington Constitutional 
Convention opened at least some of its sessions with prayer and 
the Washington State Legislature has traditionally opened its 
legislative sessions with prayer. The City Council of Spokane, 
Washington has prayed for at least the last 30 years.9 
26. During the Utah convention debates a number of 
amendments were proposed which would have prohibited funding 
secular as opposed to only "religious" institutions. The 
delegates opted for the language as originally proposed, which 
9Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 
p. 14, Exhibit "X"; R. 791-2. Excerpts from the House Journal 
and the Senate Journal of the Washington Legislature, Exhibit 
"Y"; R. 793-800. Excerpts from the Official Gazette of Spokane, 
Washington, Exhibit "Z"; R. 801-4. 
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they understood to prohibit funding religious "organizations." 
(Proceedings, p. 231 and 244-248; R. 231 and 297-301.) Thus, the 
relevant portion of Article 1 Section 4 was adopted as initially 
proposed. (Proceedings, p. 365; R. 313.) 
D. Utah State Legislature. 
27. On January 4, 1986, President Grover Cleveland 
proclaimed that the terms of the Enabling Act had been met and 
that Utah was, therefore, admitted to the Union on an equal 
footing with the original states. (Statutes at Large, 54th 
Congress, pp. 876-7. ) 
28. The first session of the State Legislature met on 
January 6, 1896. Both the Special Session, called to fix the 
date for the General Session, and the General Session itself were 
opened with prayers.10 
29. At least six members of the 1895 Constitutional 
Convention were members of the first State Legislature. (R. 
867.) No objection to opening legislative sessions with prayer 
was made by any member of the Legislature, including those 
members who had drafted and adopted Article I, Section 4 of the 
Utah Constitution. History records no objection to opening 
sessions of the legislative bodies of the State and political 
subdivisions, including cities, with prayer dating from the 
settlement of the Territory in 1847. The 1992 Utah State 
10Journal of the House, pp. 16 and 29, part of Exhibit "E", 
R. 359-65. The Journal of the Senate for 1896 was unavailable 
from the Archives at the time of the District Court action 
because it was being microfilmed in the Archives. 
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Legislature commenced every day of its legislative sessions with 
an opening prayerful invocation. (See 1992 House and Senate 
Journals. ) 
E. National Practice. 
30. Although opening ceremonial prayers are almost a 
universal practice in all states of the union and most political 
subdivisions of those states even from before the founding of the 
Republic, there are no known state decisions holding legislative 
prayers to be unconstitutional. (Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, supra. 
The Separationists' have never cited such a case.) 
F. Parties Named Below and Practical Effects of Order. 
31. - The Separationists named as defendants the individual 
members of the City Council in their representative capacity as 
elected legislators. (Complaint heading, introductory paragraph 
and prayer for relief; R. 2 and 6-7.) The Separationists 
voluntarily dismissed one Council Member when his term expired. 
(R. 785-6.) However, the Order below granted a judgment for 
costs and an injunction against the remaining Council Members 
personally. (Order; R. 1055-8. )X1 This judgment even applied 
to Nancy Pace and Tom Godfrey who had opposed the Council prayer 
policy and had voted against it.12 
32. In fear of being in contempt of the lower courts 
nA copy of the Order granting Summary Judgment is provided 
as Attachment 4 with this Brief. 
12See Defendants' Motion for Clarification and Objection to 
Proposed Implementing Order, R. 996-8. Copies of the Council 
Members Memoranda regarding the lower courtf s Order and 
Memorandum Decision are provided as Attachment 3 with this Brief. 
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Memorandum Decision,13 the City Council interrupted a citizen 
uttering a protest prayer during the March 17, 1992 Council 
meeting. (R. 1038-41.) The City Council members are also 
uncertain what constitutes a "prayer" prohibited under the lower 
court's injunction and whether any recitation, a reference or 
appeal to a God is prohibited. (Attachment 3; R. 996-8, 999-1006 
and 1032-7. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first rule of constitutional construction, to which all 
other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain the intent and 
purpose of those who framed and adopted the Constitution. 
General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 
P.2d 741 (1956). In addition, constitutional provisions are to 
be constructed together to produce a harmonious whole. 
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 
348 (1956). That is, the courts have a duty to balance competing 
values in a way that is consistent with the underlying principles 
of a representative democracy and a "check and balance system" of 
shared power. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 
(Utah 1990). 
This Court has identified a bag of tools used to interpret 
Constitution provisions including: (a) reviewing historical 
background and the framersf understanding as demonstrated by long 
accepted usage; (b) studying Convention debates; (c) reading 
13R. 978-92. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is provided 
as Attachment 2 with this Brief. 
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similar provisions and interpretations of other states; (c) 
comparing related federal provisions; (d) evaluating case law 
development; (e) reading the natural meaning of the words used; 
and, (f) balancing competing constitutional values- Matheson v. 
Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982). 
All of these interpretive tools demonstrate that the framers 
of the Constitution of Utah had no intent or purpose to preclude 
legislative opening ceremonies that include a "thought/reading/ 
invocation", such as the Policy adopted by the Salt Lake City 
Council. Rather, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Utah's 
Article I, Section 4 is not unique in its religious anti-
establishment purpose. I has adopted almost verbatim from 
Constitution of the State of Washington. 
A long historical tradition of action and interpretation 
ineluctably compels this conclusion. Utah's Territorial 
Legislature prayed. The Constitutional Convention prayed. The 
Salt Lake City Council began praying at the opening of its 
meetings 45 years before statehood. The State Legislature's 
practice of opening prayers began with its first session and has 
continued peacefully and uninterrupted for almost 100 years. 
This was true even though six delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention were also members of the first State Legislature. 
The lower court employed an improper one dimensional "plain 
meaning" analysis and ignored both history and the proper 
standards of constitutional interpretation. The trial court 
failed to interpret Article I, Section 4 consistent with the 
. 16 
framers1 intent and purpose, which was to prohibit the 
establishment of an institutional church supported by public 
resources. The lower court also failed to balance competing 
constitutional values, such as the guarantee of religious 
toleration, protections of the right of conscience, and the 
deference accorded to a separate and equal branch of government's 
right to control its proceedings. As such, the Order prohibiting 
"prayers" as a component of legislative opening ceremonies was in 
error and must be reversed. 
The Order below is further infirm because it fails to 
narrowly define its content-based prior restraint injunction. 
Under a strict scrutiny test, the Order is not limited in its 
scope on a "least restrictive means" basis. As such, the free 
speech rights of the City Council Members are violated. The 
Order impermissively gags these Council Members' right to sing 
patriotic songs, read patriotic documents, administer oaths and 
make a host of other utterances that contain prayerful 
declarations, importunings or just any simple mention of any God. 
In addition, the Order grants a personal judgment against 
elected Council Members for the legislative votes contrary to 
absolute legislative immunity and their legislative speech and 
debate privilege. The lower court also improperly held two 
Council Members vicariously liable for a legislative decision 
that each politically opposed and voted against. The Order even 
exposes these dissenters to personal liability for a money 
judgment in favor of the Separationists. 
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The lower court? s Memorandum Decision and Order are in error 
as a matter of law. They set a dangerous precedent that 
undermines a balanced accommodation of religious tolerance and 
the prohibition against a State established religion. It is not 
appropriate to establish a standard of constitutional 
construction that permits a citizen to burn the American flag in 
protest, but which requires an elected legislator, upon pain of 
contempt, to expel a citizen from a public legislative meeting 
for uttering a prayerful protest to a Court's ruling. 
The lower court's Order must be reversed. The Council's 
Policy must be declared constitutional. 
POINT I 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 
PROHIBITS OPENING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS WITH 
CEREMONIAL PRAYER THIS COURT MUST DETERMINE 
THE INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS. 
A. THE FIRST CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION IS THE DETERMINATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT AND 
PURPOSE. 
The lower court's Memorandum Decision is a strict 
constructionist assertion holding that simply because some public 
resources (over one cent) are involved in the Council opening 
ceremony, where an invocation is sometimes offered, a violation 
of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution has, ipso facto, 
occurred. (R. 978-92; Attachment 2.) Constitutional 
interpretation is made of sturdier stuff than such unsubtle 
approaches. 
Even the most preferred and privileged value in our American 
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and controls include statutes prescribing or regulating: libel 
and slander; national security secrets; commercial trade secrets; 
and obscenity.16 "Time, place and manner" regulations are also 
constitutionally employed to regulate First Amendment protected 
speech.17, 18 
In short, constitutional analysis requires more than a 
mechanical application of only the "plain meaning" tool for 
determining "intent". The lower court's "plain meaning" rule is 
not even the proper phraseology of the test it purports to adopt. 
This Court has held that only if the provisions of the 
Constitution are "crystal clear" will the constitutional framers' 
contemporaneous understanding and extemporaneous construction of 
the provisions not be utilized. This Court held: 
But if the words are ambiguous or their meaning not 
clear, or if the several provisions of the basic 
instrument are susceptible to two or more possible 
meanings or constructions, then it is proper to look 
outside the instrument itself to ascertain what the 
16See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United 
States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 86 L.Ed.. 1031 (1942); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). 
17FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 
(1978); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 89 
L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). 
18Utahfs Constitutional Analogue to the First Amendment, 
Article I, Section 15, despite its almost "crystal clarity" (no 
law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech 
or of the press") has also been held to tolerate a number of 
"yes", "no", "maybe" or "sometimes" exceptions. See, e.g., West 
Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 586 P.2d 
429 (Utah 1978); Ogden City v. Eagle Books, Inc., 586 P.2d 436 
(Utah 1978); KUTV, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456 (Utah 1984); 
and State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975). 
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.-_L- _j;il Initiative Petition No. 281, State Question No. 441 v._ 
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comparing related U.S. Constitutional concepts; considering the 
"crystal clear" language of the provision utilized; and, applying 
long historic application and construction. Matheson. supra; 
University of Utah, supra. 
Specifically, this Court has held that long and peaceful 
acquiescence in a particular meaning, demonstrated by historic 
practice dating from territorial days, will be given great weight 
in interpreting the intent and purpose of a particular provision. 
Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 382 (1970). 
This principle was clearly articulated when this Court was called 
upon to determine the constitutionality of legislation which 
stripped the state treasurer of certain functions. In construing 
the language in the constitution defining the duties of the State 
Treasurer, the Court looked to the understanding of territorial 
times and observed: 
Those duties are not specified in the Constitution 
because there was, at the time the Constitution was 
drafted and adopted, the office of territorial 
treasurer whose duties were so well known to the 
framers of the Constitution that they may have 
considered it unnecessary to detail them. 
Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 336, 463 P.2d 7, 8 (1969); see also, 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
Thus, the various devices used to ascertain intent and 
fulfill the purpose of the Constitution requires a multifaceted 
analysis. Further, there must be a balancing of other 
constitutional and societal values that are conflictingly 
reflected in the Constitution. In the instant case, these other 
values include the right of personal conscience (Article I, 
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20Memorandum Decision; R, 978-92. Attachment: L 
21First, the actual standard for construing a constitu-.. 
provision based solely on the language of the document is a 
requirement that the language be "crystal clear ' before 
extraneous evidence is admissible. University of Utah, . -<u 
at 361. (See p. 20, above.) 
Governor to determine which branch of government, under the 
Constitution and a particular statute, had the power to name 
members to the State Board of Higher Education. In answering the 
interpretative question, this Court looked at past practices in 
Utah and other states concerning residual appointment powers. In 
the only quote even close to the proposition claimed by the lower 
court, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The defendants point to a number of Utah statutes which 
create offices and provide for appointments other than 
by the Governor. The practical consideration placed on 
constitutional provisions, when long acquiesced in, is 
of aid to the courts in determining the meaning of the 
language of a constitutional provision, but it cannot 
be controlling so as to amend the Constitution by a 
means of a series of mutual mistakes, and especially is 
this true where the language is otherwise clear. 
Id. at 382. (Emphasis added.) 
Rampton, therefore, does not elevate the "plain meaning" 
rule as supreme above all other forms of constitutional 
interpretation. Rampton simply says that a traditional usage and 
understanding may be a guide to interpreting constitutional 
intent. This proposition is exactly what the City Council and 
its members have consistently argued, but which the lower court 
failed here even to consider. 
2. THE "PLAIN MEANING" RULE IS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE 
ARE AMBIGUITIES, CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
HISTORICAL USAGE THAT MUST BE EVALUATED. 
Even the crystal clarity rule, assuming it were the end of 
constitutional analysis rather than simply one of the tools, 
would be unavailing here. Absolutely nothing in Article I, 
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22Article I, Section 5 of the Const-.'. uti.. a jf Oregon 
contains a clause specifically prohibiting "any money he Ting] 
appropriated for the payment of any religeous [sic] service in 
either house of the Legislative Assembly." (Emphasis added.) 
The Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1889 and was one :f the 
documents considered by the Utah Constitutional Convention. .See 
Hickman, Appendix 1 (R. 265).) This omission of Oregon's very 
explicit prohibition on legislative religious activity is furtner 
evidence of the weakness of the argument that "almost every 
imaginable protection for religious freedom and injunction 
against the union of church ar.c state has beer: included " 
ACLU Memorandum; R. 578. With all due respect to Professor Mazor 
who wrote the article cited by the ACLU for this proposition, the 
Professor had apparently failed to read :ne Oregon Constitution. 
See, Note, Notes on a Bill of Rights ,. U13n :,. Rev. 326 , 331 
(1966). 
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Constitutional Convention did not intend to prohibit the payment 
of public monies for legislative prayers. 
Like the analysis necessary to apply the First Amendment to 
a specific factual situation, there are many ambiguities in the 
history and wording of Article I, Section 4 that need in-depth 
analysis. For example: 
(a) What is the meaning of the phrase "religious 
worship, instruction or exercise" in the context of a City 
legislative opening ceremony that has secular objectives? 
These words are no more "crystal clear" than the words 
"press" or "speech" in the First Amendment or Article I, 
Section 15. The trial court apparently chose to define the 
phrase "religious worship, instruction or exercise" as being 
synonymous with "prayer", but without consideration of its 
secular context in a legislative forum.23 
(b) If Article I, Section 4 is so plain in its meaning 
prohibiting legislative prayer, why has it taken 
approximately 145 years from the founding of Utah as a 
territory and the almost 100 years since statehood for such 
a "plain meaning" to be now miraculously revealed by the 
Separationists in this lawsuit? 
(c) Why did the lower court make no attempt to 
reconcile its newly discovered "plain meaning" of Article I, 
23The Memorandum Decision appears to adopt by reference the 
Society of Separationists' reliance on the Webster's Dictionary 
definition of "prayer" as being, ipso facto, religious worship or 
exercise. Attachment "B"; R.978-92. There is no case law or 
history that supports this construction. 
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THE INTENT OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 AS 
DETERMINED BY APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE TOOLS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION PROVES THAT 
THE CITY COUNCIL'S OPENING CEREMONY POLICY 
INCLUDING PRAYERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
Having recognized that 'hi- "plai n mean.:.no :r more 
correctly, the "crystal clarity" rule is merely one tool to 
determine the intent of a constitutional provision, this Court 
should then apply all the other tools for determining the intent 
and purpose of Article I, Section 4. Application of these tools 
demonstrate that the Separationists have failed to meet their 
burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the City Council 
practice beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The tests derived from Matheson and other cases by this 
Court for interpreting constitutional provisions conclusively 
demonstrate the true intent and purpose. These points are 
analyzed below: 
(A) Understanding and Expectations of Framers Measured by 
Historic Usage and Practice. 
The practice of opening ceremonies for legislative sessions, 
which include prayerful invocations for legislative sessions, 
predates settlement of the Utah Territories and dates to the 
founding of the American Republic. It was more than common. It 
was and is almost universally practiced in all State of the Union 
from the 1700fs to date. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
The Utah settlers were a religious people that followed this 
national tradition by commencing their legislative sessions with 
prayer, at least by 1851. Salt Lake City was incorporated in 
1851 and for some 72 years (essentially the entire period during 
which it had an independent legislative branch of government) has 
had an opening ceremony that included invocations containing 
r e f e r e n c e s to a deity. The Territorial Legislature prayed. 
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Similarly, the Utah Constitutional Convention commenced its 
meecxnc: " wi1" ^r^/sr- *> r - ^tate L^-isIa^u:^, rill :wing 
statehu ., ..^ «-... ^( * i; T' lyers, 
^See Facts . ~ <~* - A : - «i 2 a::<! 28-2*«. 
!|
 -^ * * ir4 r ~lear "v* " und:spu*^d ^h^r *--i_ 
legislative ;^:I:F"U; ceremonies *n<i* :;:r:l ided a prayerrul 
or Sal* hik^ municipal Coui:c: * o pc.ic; : . Jowing 
contrary, su ^  * :on^f*rucr i jf .•: u- 3 N r i r^ eeri ir. alien and 
foreig- con. ^  * -3 world 
and /O i ' s place . -re affairs cf :r- ^et r a^ - ^ 
( Constir jrjf i^ -i: Convention Debates ' ** i-mted States 
had rejected three earlier at: t-r-:itp t .-•» o! Ul th In b<j adniittpd in I hi 
Union, large!/ over +-he -oca; practice of polygamy and federal 
• ;i ,>>::: "" ~: * - "f •' '* • ' * i^-f \1 i1" .:cv" r^ri^' "*" and "he Vh rmcr 
\ :"iui! cJ * i" t i cre I j, oect — c.. t *»:*'i ,\; M J A . •'*.-; 
address these issues hi,* t-h. • language selectp i to 5ccom;t_ish 
t:r. .- ;..iok. ;vd 
The Convention eiecued to adopt provisions from othe^ states 
whose -onstr /irr-' h«-: ^  readv been accepted. A Utah 
const r * uriv.i. _,. :. . . ' : . . • • 
The Utah Constitution is not an unusual document. It 
is borrowed directly from orher state constitutions and 
the appeal to the authority of other states was a 
persuasive argument; £:.r t-h^  inc* is: :; of a given 
provision. 
The constant appeal to the authority of other states is 
one of the most striking impressions one gains from 
reading the debates. Frequently reference was made to 
the constitutions of the northwest states which had 
been written in 1889. The Washington Constitution in 
particular was used by the members of the Convention: 
Often Sections and Articles would be taken verbatim 
from this source. 
Hickman, supra at 72, R. 265. (Footnote omitted.) 
The debates are devoid of any discussion or concern over 
prayers at public gatherings or as a part of legislative 
sessions. In fact, there is nothing to suggest a concern or a 
view that the Utah Constitution should act as a bar to government 
recognition of a Supreme Being in governmental operations, which 
was a predominate belief of the people then as it is today. 
To the contrary, the Convention's practice of opening its 
sessions with prayer requires the conclusion that they approved 
and accepted the activity, in a governmental cont€>xt, as entirely 
appropriate. In fact, they even took pains to extol a procedure 
of including a broad diversity of religious beliefs in their * 
opening prayers as an example of religious toleration. (See Fact 
No. 22 and 23. Cf. Article III of the Utah Constitution, 
requiring "perfect toleration" of religious belief.) 
The Salt Lake City Council's invocation practice is even 
more inclusive than the process used by the constitutional 
framers of Utah's Constitution. The Council's policy is 
consistent with and would have been held to be constitutionally 
appropriate by the framers, as revealed by the Convention 
debates. 
(C) Similar State Constitutional Provisions and 
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Interpretations. ; » • ' • : " 
constitutional langucjge .vhiju si,eci t :.ca; , / oa: s legioiature 
religious ar-^ -'vi^ y • *; ..•*^ ;.-. Instead Utah adopted a 
cons:: * ur. ic : • : . * -•' ' 
legislative and municipal prayer from tit- 11 in* * r i.ts 
cons 1:i !:  1 11:i oi convention and continuing iorward to t o d a > . (Fact 
No. 2 5 ) 
There is no dispute that the practice of opening legislative 
sess i ens of state governnierits ci ties and towns (th *~^ \or,c . - -he 
country; ha~ existed -it ie-o* ic. 1 on«; aR +-he ,.;-:o;; ^ t^*-
America. T'^ ^ Seoara~ i on.: sts have c:*ed a .y case holding tra'* 
provision. 
( Federal Analogue - ^arsh v. Chambers. 
l:.<.s Separati oni t ^ n.j~ : •• -i . P 
tradition cf inc.: udi:v; ncn-denominattcna ; n»; -rroselyn r : ng 
£ r •/--• —- • •. siative cr^ cere^on** violates the 
First \mend::ie:it *.,* ;^:^ed State.-. C^i. -, ti * u* JL . no 
S e p a r a t i o n ! s^s c m : - t e d r .his c i j i m : t: an obv i :us reason 
h i . . t - r - > * i * . . . •:...
 t , * i P I • - ,i : ; o r 
of traditional, prayers :n Marsh v. Chambers, 463 . . • 
L . :rd . ?d 101 - 19R : v^ analogy. Marsh supcorts f :\ - Ci*"^ 
In Marsh, the Supreme Court considered whether the Nebraska 
legislature s cric^Lr- of opening eacr ' ^gisl^tive day with a 
p r a y e r , b y a .:u^ ::.: t n ; :; • - ;.. . *. .- ,.-MJ • .«e 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In its analysis, 
the Supreme Court traced, as the City has done in this Brief, the 
history of prayers opening legislative sessions. The Court found 
that "the Continental Congress, beginning in 1774, adopted the 
traditional procedure of opening its sessions with a prayer 
offered by a paid chaplain." Id. at 787. (Citations omitted.) 
Unlike the Utah Constitutional Convention, the United States 
Constitutional Convention did not open its days with prayer. 
However, the first United States Congress, "as one of its early 
items of business, adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to 
open each session with prayer." Id. at 787-8. The Court then 
noted that the United States Congress had consistently thereafter 
paid chaplains and opened legislative sessions with prayer. 
The Court also found that almost every state opened their 
legislative sessions with prayer. Sometimes this practice began, 
as in Utah, even before the state was admitted into the Union. 
Id. at 789, fn. 11. Moreover, the Court, in an argument directly 
applicable to the question here, noted that the First Congresses' 
decision to pray and to pay a chaplain occurred in the same week 
that the exact same members voted to approve the draft of the 
First Amendment for submission to the states. Accordingly, as 
the Court noted, it could hardly be thought that the Congress 
"intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid 
what they had just declared acceptable." Id. at 790. The Court 
concluded: 
This unique history leads us to accept the 
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who saw 
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real threat to the Establishment Clause arising i i • MII 
* i_ ract . - of prayer similar to that now challenged. 
Id. at -1 . 
.-> .r.;. ' <>r i ts decision, the Supreme C )urt emphasized 
that the First uungn=;oo di I n I • r&..: • : prayers: 
[A]s a proselytizing activity of as symbolic pidcii\; 
the governments "official seal of approval" on one 
religious view . . . . Rather, the Founding Father-. 
looked a*- invocations as "conduct whose . effec--
. harmonize[ ^  '- ' •"• ^ ene^s *" * ^ •"•-...
 : ,-o ; 
. . :ions." 
Id. at: '92. - Jitations omi ; * j:. 
rhe ?:>/ ' -"v—, :.-«i i ts analysis with language directly 
a p p l i e s . . - . * ••' • : 
Light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of 
more than two hundred (200) years, there can be no 
doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions 
with prayer has become part of the fabric of our 
society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body 
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these 
circumstances, an "establishment" of religion or a step 
toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable 
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people 
of this country. As Justice Douglas observed, " [w]e 
are a religious people whose institutions presuppos-- -
Supreme Being." 
Id. at 792. (Citations omitted,, empr.:j: : . :• ) 
The f*c".:~-" went or t-c consider three possible ways i "* -vhich 
the .ieiiicr*..- - i -.iu; • .- - . :• • --'-•,'••: to vioidce tre 
Establishment: Clause.. Wk;l- :.•<.;•:- : :: zhese three weenie... 
aff! ;^ ' the Council ^racioior o- issue here * is s*zil 1 :elpful 
to discuss :.":u tnree ;:«JIOJ.: . • .;.-.:- : • ' that the 
United States Supreme Court ..iid not tine them sufficient grounds 
t • ; .-:.• - iebraska practice 
The fi.ioi objection considered by MH» Supremo fVnirt ""M(- Hut 
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a clergyman of only one denomination - Presbyterian - had been 
selected as chaplain for sixteen years. In rejecting this fact 
as requiring invalidation of the tradition, the Supreme Court 
noted that the appointed chaplain was not the only clergyman 
heard by the legislature; guest chaplains officiated on certain 
occasions and other substitutes also gave prayers. Further, 
without "proof that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed from an 
impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not 
in itself conflict with the Establishment Clause." Id. at 793-4. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
The second attack on the Nebraska tradition involved the 
payment of the chaplain from public funds. Again, the Supreme 
Court noted that such payment was acceptable as part of a long 
tradition adopted by many state legislatures and the United 
States Congress. 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether 
Nebraska's long tradition of the prayers being primarily Judeo-
Christian in nature somehow violated the First Amendment. The 
Court noted that because there was no indication that the prayers 
were used to proselytize or advance any particular religion, or 
to disparage any other religion, there was no need for the Court 
to "embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a 
particular prayer." Id. at 795. 
None of these three potential infirmities are present in the 
instant case. No payment is made to any individual presenting 
prayer during the Opening Ceremony. Only minimal City resources 
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are i i lvolved: r"u- * :'.e ur d ui" :^' ov-p f [:--] Der'^rc * make' 
Opening Ceremon* piej^ntations and t^.- ^ ; * o ; !;:..;ne jur;:;c <::*.cl 1 
the Opening 1-oreinoiiy : .- cerf jnned, Vht-.-r
 : ils-. - religious 
b : , * . , . • . . - : • • • . 
Opening Ceremoiv . ;c*- , :;verger.i :ei;-;tcio ino :.. , .csci,n:cal 
belief- nr!TT- •^-•:i reoresenre-: ^ any K O i ^ : na - n c r been 
aft . ; --j :-_-. , . ^ . .1 
All "he S e p a r a t i o n i s t s o:' ^*:nerb neeci tc to i i -K * O r e n l o w e d 
t o s p e a k . 
The Un:"..ao s t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t has o l e a - L y r e c o g n i z e d ti la t: 
religious toleration :enu\ns traced n\ the i O r r Congress : -J 
u <- - . • • . . . . . . 
It is clear that neither the 1/ draftsmen of the 
Constitution who were Members of the First Congress, 
nor the Congress of 1739, saw any establishment problem 
in the employment of Congressional Chaplains to offer 
daily prayers in the Congress, a practice that has 
continued for nearly two centuries. It would be 
difficult to identify a more striking example of the 
accommodation of religious belief intended by the 
Framers. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, *. . . „o 
(1984 (Emphasis addea.' ; ::.H ^anu- acceptance o: tolerance 
i : • ::; i J i red I le re . • . . . ;. . 
(E) Utah Supreme Court and Federal Interpretations of 
Article I . Section 4. 
T h e U t a 1 I S i i p i: e m e C • : • i 11: t 1 I a = 1: \ i., i c e c o i: i s i d e r e d A r t: i c J e I, ' 
The Cci+z z recently reaffirmed this rUl L:\K; jnd 
distinguished legislative prayers from school graduation prayers. 
See Lee v. Weisman, _ rJ. S '" TT "* r Vs"> \ "':- ! Mr. 90-
1014, June 24, 1992) . 
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Section 4 in ways which are analogous to the instant case.25 
Both of these cases militate in favor of the constitutionality of 
the Salt Lake City Council tradition. 
In Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 
188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
State law which permitted public school teachers to receive 
retirement credit in the State Retirement System for years which 
they had spent teaching in parochial schools was not prohibited 
by Article I, Section 4. The Court held: 
Under the present plan, no money is being appropriated 
or used to maintain any school operated or controlled 
by a church and no funds are used to assist in 
maintaining any essential element of such a school. 
Likewise, no public money or property has been 
appropriated or is being applied to any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction. We fail to see how 
the amendment in any way breaches the wall between 
church and state. 
Id. at 587 (Emphasis added.) The Gubler Court construed Article 
I, Section 4 consistent with its framers' intent; it was viewed 
as an anti-establishment provision prohibiting the creation of an 
institutional church. 
In Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 
P.2d 477 (1948), this Court considered a challenge to the use of 
State funds for the construction of the Daughters of Utah Pioneer 
Museum, alleging that the project would perpetuate* and benefit 
the Mormon faith. The Court held that while there undeniably 
250ne other case in Utah has touched on the relevant portion 
of Article I, Section 4. In Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 
305, 517 P.2d 549 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the use 
of public funds to construct a hospital which was to be leased 
and operated by a church-held services corporation. 
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were certain Mormon aspects to the pioneer settlement of Utah, 
any religious effect of the Museum was merely incidental to the 
legitimate secular purpose of recognizing the heroic efforts of 
the pioneers and their struggle for religious freedom. The Court 
held: 
Educating one to the belief of religious freedom is not 
the "exercise of", "instruction in" or "worship" in any 
religious faith. The school history we teach our 
children builds up in their minds the importance of 
religious freedom. 
Id. at 489. 
In Thomas, this Court recognized that Utah was a society 
predominantly of one faith and that that faith was "imbued with 
the idea of proselytizing." Id. at 489. Accordingly, the Court 
acknowledged a need to look closely at the actual intent and 
effect of any incidental support of the Mormon faith, which might 
be caused by the Museum. In doing so, this Court decided to 
adopt "that old adage 'Actions speak louder than words.f" Id. 
The Court determined that it should "require proof of overt 
acts of proselytizing" before it found that the Museum was an 
unconstitutional public support for one particular religion. Id. 
Upon making this investigation, the Supreme Court determined that 
the Museum's legitimate secular purpose of instruction in the 
belief in religious freedom was sufficient to insulate the public 
support of the Museum from constitutional challenge under Article 
I, Section 4. 
Again, Article I, Section 4 was consistently interpreted as 
an anti-establishment provision, standing against an 
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institutional church organization being subsidized in its mission 
with public assets. Thus, Thomas supports the City Council's 
argument that Article I, Section 4 was not intended to prohibit 
the practice of legislative prayer for defined secular purposes. 
Federal case law from Utah is also consistent with this 
Court's anti-establishment construction of Article I, Section 4. 
In Anderson v. Salt Lake City, 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered 
whether or not a granite monolith inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments placed outside the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in 
Salt Lake City violated either the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. The Tenth Circuit did not 
distinguish between the prohibitions imposed by the two differing 
Constitutions. Instead, it analyzed both constitutional 
challenges based on case law from the United States Supreme Court 
construing the First Amendment. 
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the United States Supreme 
Court has long held that the First Amendment does not call for an 
impossible total separation between church and state. Id. at 
32.26 Instead Anderson chose to look at whether the primary 
effect of challenged activity was the advancement or inhibition 
of religion. Id.27 
26Citing, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971) reh'g den'd, 404 U.S. 876 (1971). 
27Citing, Abinqton School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 
222, 10 L.Ed.2d 844, 858, (1963). 
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The Tenth Circuit recognized that the level of permissive 
relationship between church and state involved a balancing test 
"between that which is primarily religious and that which is 
primarily secular, albeit embodying some religious impact." 
Anderson, 475 F.2d at 32. 
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Ten 
Commandments on the monolith were "at once religious and secular" 
and that this dual function was part of "the role of religion in 
our traditions." Jd. at 33. Finally, with language almost 
directly precedented here, the Tenth Circuit concluded that 
"[t]he wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate obliteration of all our 
religious traditions." Id. 
(F) Purpose and Design of Other Constitutional Provisions, 
The Preamble to the Utah Constitution has a prayerful 
intonation stating: "Grateful to Almighty God for life and 
liberty, . . . " Also, Article III guarantees religious 
toleration stating: "Perfect toleration of religious sentiment 
is guaranteed." (Emphasis added.) The first sentence of Article 
I, Section 4 mandates that the rights of conscience "shall never 
be infringed." 
The lower court's injunction against prayer is totally 
incongruous with the Constitution's Preamble and Article Ill's 
guarantee of religious toleration. As such, the Decision and 
Order are at odds with the requirement that the Constitution be 
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construed as a harmonious whole document,28 
Unlike the lower court's terribly limiting Memorandum 
Decision and Order, the Council's Policy, both in writing and in 
practice, are ecumenical. The Council not only tolerates, but 
actually invites, the participation of all religious and 
philosophical points of view. The Separationists and the lower 
court apparently will tolerate only one religious sentiment -
absolute silence. 
When the proper tools of constitutional interpretation are 
employed in searching out the intent and purpose of the 
Constitution's framers (not just blind reliance on some newly 
discovered "plain meaning"), it becomes clear that Article I, 
Section 4 was not and could not have been intended to prohibit 
opening ceremonies for legislative bodies that included 
"readings/thoughts or invocations" such as that permitted by the 
Salt Lake City Council. 
POINT III 
THE SEPARATIONISTS FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE 
CITY COUNCIL'S PRESUMPTIVELY VALID 
LEGISLATIVE ACT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
One of the basic tenets of American democracy is the 
principle of a limited government, whose powers are held in check 
through the doctrine of separation of powers. See, Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 175, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). A key to 
the continued maintenance of this doctrine is that one co-equal 
Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964). 
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branch of government will not lightly set aside or disregard the 
actions of another co-equal branch of government* 
To avoid such improper dominance of one branch of 
government, the courts must exercise great discretion and caution 
to preserve the separation of powers system, upon which our 
system of democracy depends. Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 2d 336, 
463 P.2d 7 (1969). 
In this regard, this Court has poignantly observed: 
["The Utah Supreme Court] makes every reasonable 
presumption in favor of constitutionality and will not 
nullify a legislative enactment unless it is clear and 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. In seeking 
the correct application of statutes and constitutional 
provisions, the Court looks to the circumstances which 
brought them into being and the purposes sought to be 
accomplished. 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Utah Insurance Guaranty 
Association., 564 P.2d 751, 753-4 (Utah 1977). (Emphasis added.) 
Municipal legislative acts, like State statutes, are 
presumptively valid and Utah Courts should employ every 
reasonable construction to render such an act valid and 
constitutional. Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 
(Utah 1975), cert, den'd, 425 U.S. 915 (1976). This rationale is 
equally applicable to municipal legislative actions memorialized 
through the adoption of a legislative "resolution" such as the 
Councilfs Opening Ceremony Policy.29 
9This observation is compelled by the fact that a 
"resolution" is, like an "ordinance", a statement legislative 
will or policy. The statutes specifically provide that 
"resolutions" shall be in the same form as "ordinances" and that 
votes for each shall be by roll call. See Sections 10-3-506, 717 
and 718, U.C.A. Further, even though legislative power is 
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In the case at bar, the duly elected representatives of Salt 
Lake City have memorialized their Policy regarding legislative 
sessions, through the adoption of a formal Resolution. This 
expression of the City legislatures will for managing its own 
internal affairs and establishing a mood of respect and solemnity 
for its business is cloaked in the presumption of validity. 
Absent a compelling and clearly articulated violation of 
constitutional law, which the Separationists have the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should uphold the 
Council practice. This burden and review standard is necessary 
to preserve the separation of powers principle and afford 
appropriate deference to legislators, elected by the people (the 
ultimate sovereigns) of this State. Since the Separationists 
have failed to present any evidence rebutting this presumption of 
constitutionality30 and have erroneously relied solely on the 
"plain meaning" rule, the lower court's decision must be 
usually exercised by ordinances (especially where criminal 
sanctions, fines or forfeitures are to be employed), the law 
permits the legislative body to exercise certain legislative 
powers by adoption of a "resolution". Section 10-3-717, U.C.A. 
In fact, the ultimate power of any legislature, its budgeting 
power, can be exercised in Utah cities by either ordinance or 
resolution. Section 10-6-118, U.C.A. Under Salt Lake Cityfs 
optional Council-Strong Mayor form of governance, the City 
Council is limited to performing legislative powers. Martindale 
v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978). 
30The Separationists' only evidence was the Whisner 
Affidavit which was facially defective as being nothing more than 




THE ORDER ENJOINING "PRAYER" BEING ALLOWED OR 
CONDUCTED BY INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL MEMBERS 
VIOLATES THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF FREE 
SPEECH AND VIOLATES RULE 65A(d) OF THE UTAH 
R.CIV.P. 
The lower court Order enjoins individual Council Members, 
It provides that: 
• . . defendants, their agents and employees are 
permanently prohibited and enjoined from allowing or 
having prayers recited at meetings of the Salt Lake 
City Council and they are permanently enjoined and 
prohibited from expending public funds, resources or 
property to encourage such prayers . . • 
(Order; R. 1056-7. Attachment 4.) 
The City Council Members objected to the Order and requested 
the lower court to define the word "prayer", (Council Members' 
Objection, R. 996-1006, 1032-7. Attachment 3.) This Motion was 
denied and the lower court refused to narrow the dictionary 
definition of "prayer," which it had apparently adopted by 
reference. (Memorandum Decision, p. 14; R.992. Attachment 2. 
Cf. the definition of "prayer" in the Separationists' Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 15; R. 515.) 
The definition of "prayer" contemplated by the lower court's 
Order includes any address to a God or petition for divine 
intervention. As such, the individual Council Members may 
presumably be enjoined from: 
31The lower court's "plain meaning" decision, without any 
historical or legal support from the Separationists, amounts to 
the amendment of the Constitution by a one judge referendum in 
violation of Article XXIII. 
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1. Administering oaths compelling people to tell the truth 
"so help them God" in legislative investigations, as authorized 
by Utah law;32 
2. Uttering a personal oath or making an appeal to God 
(profane or otherwise) at a Council meeting or on public 
property; 
3. Permitting citizens to exercise their free rights to 
speak (pray), even in protest during Council meeting (see Fact 
No. 32); 
A. Personally participating, authorizing or encouraging 
others to join in prayer days at Council meetings, such as: 
responding to an appeal by the President of the United States for 
a national day of prayer for peace in Los Angeles or the Middle 
East; participating in a candlelight and prayer vigil with Mrs. 
Martin Luther King concerning Civil Rights adherence; or allowing 
prayers related to the State administering the death penalty. 
This naked prior restraint over the content of speech and 
conscience violates the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Under the 
required "most exacting scrutiny" test, the Order is not narrowly 
tailored to limit its application to a compelling government 
interest and does not use the "least restrictive means" to 
accomplish that purpose. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 99 
3210-3-1213, 78-24-17, 18, U.C.A.; Rule 30(c) U.R.C.P. and 
Rule 603 Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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L.Ed.2d 333, 345 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 
177, 75 L.Ed.2d 736, 744 (1983); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). 
In addition, the Order is facially overbroad and leaves the 
Council Members left to guess as to its application. Without 
clarification, the Council Members are unable to determine if any 
of the following activities identified in their Opening Ceremony 
Policy violates the lower court's Order: (1) pledging allegiance 
to a flag of ". . . one nation under God;" (2) saying or reciting 
the National Anthem, a hymn, with its prayerful admonition to 
"praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation"; or 
(3) singing or reciting many patriotic songs and historic 
documents, including the State Constitutional Preamble, the 
Declaration of Independence and the Utah State Song.33 
Each of these historic expressions could be categorized as 
"prayer" under the Webster' s Dictionary definition which the 
lower court apparently adopted. Further, the Order is ambiguous 
about whether such activities as allowing the performance of 
Handel's Hallelujah Chorus, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, Christmas 
carols or hymns performed in the City and County Building would 
be a "prayer" in violation of the Court's Order. 
Rule 65A, U.R.C.P., the maxims of equity, fundamental 
fairness and elementary due process require that orders which may 
subject persons to contempt must be sufficiently clear to allow 
the enjoined to know what conduct is proscribed and prohibited. 
33For exact quotes see Exhibit "P"; R. 448-52. 
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By not defining prohibited "prayer", the lower court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order fail these tests. Further, the lack of a 
definition of prohibited "prayer" makes the appellate review by 
this Court extremely difficult. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ORDER VIOLATES THE CITY 
LEGISLATORS' SPEECH AND DEBATE PRIVILEGE AND 
THEIR ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers and the legislative 
immunity known as the "speech or debate" privilege grants 
legislators absolute immunity. United States Constitution, 
Article I, §6; Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 8; Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). The United 
States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that one of the very 
limited areas in which it recognizes absolute immunity is for 
"legislators carrying out rheir legislative functions . . . " 
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. , , 116 L.Ed.2d 301, 312 (1991). 
In Tenney, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether or not the Civil Rights Act allowed allegedly injured 
citizens to sue individual legislators for their legislative 
actions.34 The Court exhaustively analyzed the common-law 
history of the legislative "speech or debate" privilege. Tracing 
the privilege back to the British Parliament and the struggle of 
Sir Thomas More in 1523, the Court recognized that such 
legislative immunity was one of the bedrock foundations of the 
34At the time Tenney was considered, the Civil Rights 
statutes were found at 8 U.S.C. §§43 and 47(3). 
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American system of democracy. The Court quoted James Wilson, a 
signatory of the Constitution who was an influential member of 
the Committee of Detail which placed the Speech or Debate Clause 
in the Federal Constitution: 
In order to enable and encourage a representative of 
the public to discharge his public trust with firmness 
and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he 
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he 
should be protected from the resentment of every one, 
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty 
may occasion offense. 
Id. at 373. 
Based on the fundamental nature of the "speech or debate" 
privilege and its long history, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the privilege existed as a matter of common-law. 
Further, the privilege protects all legislative acts whether 
worthy or unworthy, wise or unwise, popular or unpopular. Id. at 
376-8. The motives, opinions and any other reason for an 
individual legislator's legislative activities and, thus, the 
votes themselves, are simply beyond question in the courts. The 
Court summarized: 
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the 
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty . . . . 
* * * 
The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of 
determining that a flegislative body's actions! may 
fairly be deemed within its province. 
Id. at 377-8. (Footnotes omitted, citations omitted, emphasis 
added.) 
The Supreme Court has followed this appropriately broad 
recognition of legislative "speech or debate" privilege in a 
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number of cases. The Court has gone so far as to say that 
legislators not only are protected from "the consequences of 
litigation's results but also from the burdens of defending 
themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 
(1967); see, also, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 
446 U.S. 719, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) and United States v. Johnson, 
383 U.S. 169, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). 
There is no logical reason for excluding elected municipal 
legislators such as the Council Members from protection under the 
speech or debate privilege. At most, even assuming the lower 
court's decision on the constitutionality of the Council policy 
was correct, any order should have been limited to a declaratory 
ruling on the constitutionality of the Council Policy. 
The Council Members timely objected to overbreadth and 
individualized effect of the proposed order. The lower court 
denied this motion and granted an injunction and judgment 
directed personally at individual legislators.35 
The Order even held Tom Godfrey and Nancy Pace liable for 
costs and enjoined them from following a Policy that they 
politically opposed and voted against. In effect these two 
elected officials were held vicariously liable for the 
independent votes of other legislators. They were thus forced to 
appeal to prevent executions on their personal assets during the 
pendency of the other Council Members' appeal. 
The lower court's Order facially violates the legislative 
35R. 996-1006, 1032-7 and 1055-8. Attachments 3 and 4. 
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immunities and associated speech and debate privileges of the 
Council Members. As such, it must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The intent and purpose of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution was to prevent the establishment of an institutional 
church, funded or maintained by public assets. It was not 
intended to exclude legislative opening ceremonies that recognize 
a Supreme Being or preclude invocations addressed to a God. The 
lower court erred in its ruling to the contrary. 
The lower court's Order is, further, overly broad and 
content based prior restraint. Thus, it infringes on the 
constitutional rights of speech, legislative immunity and the 
speech and debate privileges of the City's elected legislators. 
In addition, the Order holds some individual legislators 
vicariously liable for actions they politically opposed and voted 
against, contrary to their rights and immunities. 
The City Council's Policy regarding its Opening Ceremonies 
was carefully crafted to advance many secular objectives 
including recognition of cultural diversity and adding solemnity 
to its proceedings, without "establishing" a City religion. The 
Separationists failed to meet their burden to overcome the 
Policy's presumptive constitutionality. 
It would be a sad day for Utah jurisprudence if someone was 
constitutionally protected in burning the flag as a protest 
statement, while elected legislative representatives of the 
people enjoined by court from uttering prayerful declarations. 
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The Memorandum Decision and Order below are manifestly in error 
and patently defective. They must be reversed. This Court 
should hold that the City Council may constitutionally open its 
legislative meetings with prayers. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of August, 1992. 
BRUefi R. BAIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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POLICY: OPENING CEREMONIES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS 
CONDUCTED EY COUNCIL 
The Presentation of Thoughts, Readinas and Invocations at 
Salt Lake City Council Meetings. 
A. Purpose and Policy. 
The Salt Lake City Council has traditionally invited 
the presentation of thoughts, readings and invocations, 
along with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, as an 
Opening Ceremony before certain of its meetings. This 
opening to the City's legislative process is solely for 
a secular purpose, among other reasons, to: (1) provide 
a moment during which Council Members and the audience 
can reflect on the importance of the business before 
the Council; (2) promote an atmosphere of civility; (3) 
encourage lofty thought and high-mindedness; (4) 
recognize cultural diversity; (5) foster sensitivity 
for and recognize the uniqueness of all segments of our 
community. The presentations shall be done on a 
volunteer basis and without cost to the City. The 
presentations are intended to be non-denominational and 
non-proselytizing in character; however, the City will 
not dictate the form or content of any such 
presentation. 
It is the formal policy of the Salt Lake City Council 
to seek out a wide variety of community organizations, 
churches and individuals to offer thoughts, readings 
and invocations at Council meetings to achieve its 
stated purposes. 
Procedure. 
1. Thoughts, readings and invocations, together with 
a Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, will be given 
at the beginning of regular Tuesday Council 
meetings. 
2. Police Chaplain Max Yospe or a successor 
designated by the Council will coordinate the 
presentation of thoughts, readings and 
invocations, as he has done in the past. When the 
scheduled individual does not attend the meeting, 
the Council will not make any last minute 
substitutions and the meeting will begin without 
any such presentation, except for the Pledge to 
the Flag. 
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3. Council staff will mail a letter every six months 
to a very wide variety of churches and other civic 
organizations, inviting them to contact Mr. Yospe 
to be scheduled for presenting a thought, reading 
or invocation. Enclosed in the mailing will be a 
copy of the thought/reading/invocation suggestion 
sheet. Individuals who have not received a 
written invitation from the Council, but who want 
to participate are also welcome to present a 
thought, reading or invocation at a Council 
meeting by requesting, in writing, an opportunity 
through Chaplain Yospe or Council staff. 
4. Every six months, Council staff will ask the City 
Recorder to give the City Attorney, Police 
Chaplain and City Council a listing of the 
individuals giving thoughts, readings and 
invocations and their religious or other relevant 
affiliation, if available. 
5. The attached "Suggestions for Presenters" will be 
given to each person who is designated to give a 
thought, reading or invocation as a 
memorialization of the Council's objectives and 
desires regarding this issue. 
6. In order to better inform those attending Council 
meetings that thoughts and readings, as well as 
invocations, are welcome at Council meetings, the 
title on the section of the Council agenda will 
read •'Invocation/Reading/Thought." 
C. Meetings Excluded. 
The Opening Ceremonies above described will not be 
utilized for the Council's District Town Meetings, 
Committee-as-a-Whole Meetings, or special or emergency 
meetings, unless directed by the Chair and approved by 
a majority of the Council. 
II. Other Public Gatherings Conducted bv the Council. 
A. Purpose and Policy. 
Consistent with Section IA, above, it may be 
appropriate to have Opening Ceremonies for other public 
meetings and gatherings, conducted under the auspices 
of the Council. 
B. Content and Procedure. 
The Chair designated to conduct such a public meeting 
may establish an appropriate Opening Ceremony, 
consistent with the theme and purpose of that occasion. 
The ceremony may include: (1) Thoughts, reading or 
invocations, not inconsistent with the policies and 
procedures of Section IA above; (2) patriotic song(s), 
including but not limited to: the National Anthem, 
"America the Beautiful", "My Country 'Tis of Thee", the 
State Song, or other similar songs of patriotism 
generally recognized in the community; (3) the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the Flag; (4) recitations from the 
cannon of American or Utah historical documents, such 
as but not limited to: the Declaration of Independence, 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address or Washington's Farewell 
to the Nation Speech; or (5) any combination thereof. 
Council Modification. 
Any ceremony selected by the Chairperson may be modified, 
canceled or amended by a majority vote of the Council. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THOSE WHO PRESENT 
TH0UGHTS/READINGS7INV0CATI0NS IN 
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL MEETINGS 
Thank you for taking the time to volunteer to continue our 
tradition of presenting a thought/reading/invocation at a City 
Council meeting. We have found from long experience that a 
thought/reading/invocation as a part of the opening ceremony at 
the beginning of Council meetings creates a thoughtful atmosphere 
in which to perform our services to the community. This practice 
promotes civility, sensitivity and cultural diversity. 
We recognize that we live in a community where? there are 
many and diverse points of view on religion and other matters of 
philosophy. Therefore, to eliminate or reduce offense, if your 
belief or philosophy allows you to do so, we ask that your 
thought/reading/invocation comply with the following: 
1. References which may recognize or be unique to a 
particular religious belief should be avoided. 
2. The thought/reading/invocation should not include an 
attempt to convert or advance any particular faith, belief or 
philosophy or disparage any other faith, belief or philosophy. 
3. All such presentations will be made gratuitously and as 
a part of the Opening Ceremony of each of the City Council's 
regular Tuesday meetings, which will also includes a Pledge of 
Allegiance to the Flag. 
The City will not regulate or dictate the form or substance 
of a presentation. Rather, these guidelines are to remind you of 
the cultural diversity of the community and request that all 
statements be sensitive to the feelings of others and promote 
understanding, elevate motives and create a more civil 
environment for conducting the public's business. 
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL* 
*Per Council Resolution of 10/17/91. 
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CIVIL NO. 910906136 
The parties have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
in the instant action. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this 
Court that the City Council's practice of including, for a 
number of stated secular purposes, a prayer as part of its 
opening ceremonies, violates Article I, Section 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
This Court, on January 13, 1992, granted the Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus Brief on behalf of the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Utah, Inc. 
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Oral arguments on the respective motions were heard 
February 21, 1991. 
OPERATIVE FACTS 
1. The 1911 Utah State Legislature merged the legislative 
and executive functions of the city government into a 
commission form of government. Prayer was not usually offered 
during these meetings for the years 1911 through 1979. 
2. In 1980, pursuant to Title 10-3-1701, et seq., Utah 
Code Ann., 1953, Salt Lake City adopted the Council-Strong 
Mayor form of government. This form of government strictly 
separates the executive and legislative functions. The 
executive functions are carried out solely by the mayor, with 
the legislative functions reserved to the City Council. 
3. At its first meeting on January 8, 1980, the City 
Council decided to open the meeting with a ceremony which 
included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer. From January 
15, 198 0 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City 
Council reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered 
at the beginning of each weekly legislative meeting. 
4. In a letter dated September 23, 1987, Assistant City 
Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council 
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that pursuant to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) , 
opening ceremonies including prayerful invocations were 
constitutionally permissible. 
5. Beginning on May 17, 1988, the City Council 
reinstituted the practice of including prayers as part of the 
opening ceremonies of the Council meetings. Prayers were not 
said before the Salt Lake City Council from October 15, 1987 
through May 17, 1988. Defendants acknowledge that the practice 
of the City Council from 1980 to 1987 was to have prayers and 
invocations. 
6. On October 17, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council 
adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy by a vote of 5 to 2. 
7. The formally adopted City Council Policy provides that 
as part of an opening ceremony, the City Council will hear 
various thoughts, readings and invocations prior to beginning 
certain legislative sessions. Contrary to the formally adopted 
City Council Policy, at leasr two of the defendant City Council 
members acknowledge that prayers and invocations before the 
City Council have always been offered and will continue to be 
offered for religious purposes. Yet, the City Council Policy 
specifies that the offering of these thoughts, readings and 
invocations is for a number of secular purposes. These 
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specified secular purposes include the provision of a moment 
during which the Council members and the audience can reflect 
on the business before the Council; the promotion of an 
atmosphere of civility; the encouragement of lofty thought and 
high-mindedness; the recognition of cultural diversity; and the 
fostering of sensitivity for and recognition of the uniqueness 
of all segments of our community. 
8. The Council Policy expresses a preference for 
non-denominational and non-proselyting opening ceremony 
presentations. Presentation of the opening ceremony is 
coordinated by the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain. Pursuant to 
the Policy, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain can make 
arrangements to give their opening presentation. The 
presenters are not compensated in any way. 
9. Salt Lake City employee, Ed Snow, spent two days in 
the fall of 1990 making telephone calls to sign up people that 
would offer prayers at the City Council meetings. He 
indicated that the City has an extensive mailing list of 
churches which was used to invite religious leaders to contact 
the City to offer prayers. 
10. Defendant Council member Godfrey acknowledges that the 
City Council's desire and goal to have non-denominational 
prayers has not been successful. 
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11. Defendant Council member Nancy Pace on October 17, 
1991 stated with regard to the defendant's recently enacted 
Policy regarding prayer before City Council meetings, "I don't 
believe that what we're doing [offering prayers] could be 
construed as secular and I don't believe that would hold up in 
court." 
12. On September 10, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council 
allowed the recitation of the following prayer by the Chaplain 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department: 
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this 
night to be able to meet in this forum and 
we ask Thee to bless those who participate, 
that their minds will be clear and decisions 
will be made that will be fair and equitable 
to the citizens of the City. We are 
grateful for our government. We are 
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we 
are grateful for the safe return of our 
troops from the Gulf. We ask these 
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen. 
13. Although requested orally and in writing to cease said 
practice, the defendants have declined to do so. 
14. Defendants admit that "existing city facilities, 
assets and a small amount of time11 are used in conducting the 
invocations. The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings 
results in the expenditure of public funds, assets and 
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resources of Salt Lake City Corporation. City facilities 
(meeting rooms, etc.)/ City equipment (microphones, podiums, 
stages, etc.), City resources (electricity, printing of 
programs, etc.), and City employees' time (in supervising, 
attending, etc.), are used and expended in programming, 
witnessing and/or reciting said prayers. Said funds, assets 
and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid 
in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval, 
concurrence and ratification of the defendants. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs have sought Summary Judgment against the 
defendants seeking to enjoin the presentation of prayers and 
invocations as part of the Salt Lake City Council meetings in 
that the same constitutes an expenditure and appropriation by 
defendants of funds and resources in violation of the 
prohibitory provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Specifically, it is argued the Utah Constitution 
establishes the right of citizens to have no public money spent 
on a religious exercise, the right to a government free of 
sectarian influence or control, and the right to entertain 
their own religious ideas free of state intrusions. These 
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guarantees of religious autonomy and absolute separation of 
church and state explicitly go beyond those protections offered 
by the United States Constitution. In expanding the rights of 
its citizens, the Utah Constitution it is argued, distinctly 
and separately rejects the practice of praying before 
legislative meetings. 
Defendants have responded by arguing that notwithstanding 
the differences in the language of the Utah Constitution to 
that of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
this Court shoul'd decide the issue presented the way it has 
been decided by the United States Supreme Court in the matter 
of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in that such 
traditional prayers are, under specified circumstances, 
acceptable under the First Amendment and do not constitute an 
establishment of religion. It is argued by the defendants that 
the offering of non-denominational, non-proselyting prayers for 
specified secular purposes at "legislative" sessions is 
acceptable under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 
Utah. Furthermore, it is argued, the expenditures are de 
minimus. 
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in pertinent 
part declares: 
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The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The state shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;. . . 
There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State, or 
interfere with its functions. No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support 
of any ecclesiastical establishment. . . . 
No prior Utah Supreme Court cases have specifically 
interpreted the foregoing constitutional provision insofar as 
it relates to the exercise or the allowance of prayers and/or 
invocations at city council or legislative meetings. Moreover, 
none of the cases cited by counsel are specifically on point. 
However, while not of precedential value, it is instructive to 
examine decisions from other state courts which have 
interpreted comparable provisions of their own constitutions. 
Article I, Section 5, of the Oregon Constitution states: 
No money shall be drawn from the treasury 
for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or 
theological institution, nor shall any money 
be appropriated for the payment of any 
religeous [sic] services in either house of 
the Legislative assembly. 
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This provision was interpreted by the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in the matter of Kay v. Douglas School District, 719 
P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986)- The Oregon court interpreted the 
prohibition of public expenditure on religious institutions 
strictly, finding it applicable even though a teacher in a 
public school had scheduled to read a prayer on volunteered 
time. The court held, as follows: 
The fact that money spent on the preparation 
and delivery of the invocation was not 
apportioned and identified as a "line item" 
in the budget does not take it out of the 
proscription of Section 5, which prohibits 
the spending of any money for the benefit 
of any religious or theological institution. 
Id. at 878. (Emphasis original) 
In the matter of Sands v. Moronao Unified School District, 
809 P.2d 809, at 836 (Cal. 1991), three members of the 
California Supreme Court determined that governmental support 
and endorsement of graduation prayers violated both the state 
and federal constitutions. 
They refused to find the supposed "sectarian" nature of the 
prayers acceptable, insisting that a practice is 
unconstitutional "when it appears to place the government's 
stamp of approval on a particular type of religious practice, 
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such as public prayer." Id. at 816- Article XVI, Section 5, 
of the California Constitution provides: 
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, 
city and county, township, school district, 
or other municipal corporation, shall ever 
make an appropriation, or pay from any 
public fund whatever, or grant anything to 
or in aid of any religious sect, church, 
creed, or sectarian purpose. . . . 
Judge Mosk, concurring, stated that, lf[S]tate courts are 
and should be, the first: line of defense for individual 
liberties....11 Id. at 836. Two additional judges of the 
California Supreme Court having concurred in the finding that 
the practice involved violated the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, declined to reach the issue of 
whether or not the practice involved violated the California 
Constitution. The remaining two judges determined there was no 
violation. 
Clearly, the pertinent provisions in the Utah Constitution 
in question, have no counterparts in the federal constitution, 
and are not intended to be restricted by interpretations of the 
United States Constitution. Instead, as asserted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the state constitution embodies certain of the 
provisions of the federal constitution, and then expands and 
expounds on these in greater detail: 
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[Pjrovision of Section 4, Article I, of the 
Utah Constitution. . . is more articulate 
and express in assuring religious liberty 
and prohibiting discrimination, or church 
interference with private or public rights, 
than the generality of the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, at 
552 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring). 
One scholar has observed: 
Compared to the brief and almost 
enigmatic statement on religion in the 
federal constitution, the Utah 
constitution's provisions seem prolix 
indeed. Almost every imaginable protection 
for religious freedom and injunction against 
the union of church and state has been 
included. 
[T]he union of church and state is 
expressly prohibited. . . and appropriations 
of public money or property to "any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment" are proscribed. 
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State 
Constitution, Utah L.Rev. 326, at 331 (1966) . 
One of the principal, if not the first canon of statutory 
or constitutional construction is that if the language of a 
statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, 
examination of legislative intent is unnecessary. In Ramptgn 
v. Barlow, 464 P. 2d 378 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court held 
that if the language of a statute or constitutional provision 
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was clear, no resort to assumed intent was necessary. 
"[Ijntent is to be found from the instrument itself; and when 
the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the 
courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to 
search for its meaning beyond the instrument." Hines v. 
Winters, 320 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1957). 
To get at the thought or meaning expressed 
in a statute...or a Constitution, the first 
resort, in all cases, is to the natural 
signification of the words.... If the words 
convey a definite meaning which involves no 
absurdity, nor any contradiction of other 
parts of the instrument, then that meaning, 
apparent on the face of the instrument, must 
be accepted and neither the courts nor the 
Legislature have the right to add to it or 
take from it. 
Shaw v. Grumbie, 273 P. 311 (Okla. 1929) 
Where there exists no ambiguity in the language of the 
document to be interpreted, and the interpretation therefore is 
not doubtful, there is little reason to resort to factors 
outside the words themselves for the meaning of the provision. 
In this instance, the constitutional provision in question 
is unambiguous and capable of ready interpretation. The 
unequivocal, unconditional pronouncements of Article I, Section 
4 leave little room for clarification and interpretation. 
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It is this Court's obligation to make every reasonable 
presumption in favor of constitutionality, and this Court will 
not nullify legislative enactments unless it is clear and 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co. v, Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc, 564 P.2d 751, 753 
(Utah 1977) . A legislative enactment is presumed to be valid 
and in conformity with the constitution. For purposes of this 
decision, the defendants' adopted Policy is treated as 
"legislative" action, though there is some doubt. It should 
not be held to be invalid unless it has been shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some particular 
constitutional provision. Salt Lake Citv v. Savage, 541 P.2d 
1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert, den., 425 U.S. 915 (1976). 
The language of the Utah Constitution sets forth the 
absolute law which Utah governmental officials are bound to 
follow. 
By encouraging, supporting, allowing or condoning religious 
worship before its sessions, the Council is enmeshed in 
non-secular entanglements. By planning for and presenting 
public prayers as part of their opening ceremonies, the City 
Council uses public funds to aid and support the religious 
practice of prayer. 
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Government prayer does involve the expenditure of public 
funds. The City Council has spent time and money to develop 
guidelines for those offering invocations. The Council members 
and City employees are paid to observe and be solemnized by the 
exercise- City employees must schedule and arrange for the 
attendance of the person offering prayer. Moreover, the 
facilities intended for use of the City are appropriated for 
the actual presentation of prayer. Such expenditures contrary 
to the argument of defendants, are not de minimus, but on the 
contrary, represent a serious threat to constitutionally 
protected rights. The Constitution of Utah dictates in clear 
and bold terms that religious exercise must be separate from 
the functions of government. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in 
the Memoranda in support of the plaintiff's requested relief, 
the plaintiff's Summary Judgment is granted as prayed. 
Defendant's cross Morion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare the appropriate Orders. 
Dated this IS^av of March, 1992. 
JL DENNIS FREDERICK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit corporation; 
RICHARD ANDREWS; and J. WALKER, 
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vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN XIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council, 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
FOR CLARIFICATION OF 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Civil No. 910905135 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
In support of their objections to the plaintiffs' Proposed 
Order Granting Summary Judgment and their further motion for 
clarification of the Court's Memorandum Decision, the defendants 
submit the following Memorandum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION AND PROPOSED ORDER 
ARE AMBIGUOUS AND OVERBROAD IN THE USE OF THE 
WORD "PRAYER". 
The adopted City policy regarding Opening Ceremonies 
provides for the presentation of "thoughts, readings and 
invocations," along with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag. 
(See Exhibit "0" to the defendants' Original Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment.) The policy also allows for the 
Opening Ceremony to include patriotic songs such as America the 
Beautiful, The National Anthem and others. The ceremony may also 
include recitations from various American or Utah historical 
documents, including the Declaration of Independence and the Utah 
Constitution. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision of March 2, 1992 contains no 
definition of what would be prohibited as a "prayer". However, 
by incorporating in its rationale the "[reasons] set forth in the 
[plaintiffs'] Memoranda", the Court mav be adopting by reference 
the Webster's Dictionary definition, which broadly defines prayer 
to include any address to a god or any petition for divine 
intervention. (Court's Memorandum Decision, p. 14; Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 15.) However, the 
only activity clearly prohibited by the Memorandum Decision would 
be a repetition of the September 10, 1991 offering made by the 
Salt Lake Police Chaplin. (See paragraph 12 of the Memorandum 
Decision.) The plaintiffs' Proposed Order carries forward the 
same definitional omission. 
Rule S5A(d), U.R.C.P. requires that orders granting 
injunctions "be specific in terms [and] describe in reasonable 
detail, and not by reference to the Complaint or other document, 
the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . ." The Proposed 
Order fails this test and the Memorandum Decision requires 
clarification on the same point. At a minimum, the Order must 
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define what is prohibited as a '•prayer". Without this 
clarification the defendants are unable to determine whether 
engaging in any of the following activities of the adopted poi 
would constitute a "prayer" in violation of the Order: 
A. Pledge to Flac. Pledging allegiance to a flag of ". 
one nation under God," 
B. Saying or reciting the following: 
1. National Anthem fHvmn). 
Blessed with victory and oeacs, 
mav the heav'n rescued land 
praise the oow'r that hath made 
and preserved us a nation! 
Then conquer we must 
when our cause it is just 
and this be our motto: 
'In God is Our Trust7 
and the Star Spangled Banner 
in triumph shall waive 
over the land of the free 
and the home of the brave! 
2. America. 
America! America! 
God shed his crace on thee, 
and crown thev good with brotherhood 
from sea to shining sea. 
3. Utah State Song. 
With wealth and peace in store, 
to fame and glory soar, 
God-guarded evermore, 
Utah, we love thee. 
4. Preamble: Utah Constitution. 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and 
liberty, we, the people of Utah in order to 
secure and perpetuate the principles of free 
government do ordain and establish this 
CONSTITUTION." 
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5. Declaration of Independence. 
(a) We hold these truths to be self-evidence, 
that all Men are created equal, that thev are 
endowed bv their creator with certain 
inalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
(b) When in the course of human Events, it 
becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the 
Political Bands which have connected then with 
another, and to assume among the powers of the 
Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the 
Laws of nature and of nature's god entitle them, a 
decent respect for the Opinions of mankind 
requires that they should declare the causes which 
impel them to the Separation. 
(c) We, therefore, the Representatives of the 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS 
Assembly appeal to the Supreme Judge of the World 
for the rectitude of our Intentions, in the Name 
and by the Authority of the Good People of these 
Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare That the 
United Colonies of Right ought to be, FREE A-ND 
INDEPENDENT STATES, . . . 
(d) For the support of this Direction, with firm 
Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, 
we mutually pledge each other our Lives, our 
Fortunes, and our sacred Honor. 
f Emphasis added.\ Each of these phrases are "prayer" under the 
Webster definition, apparently adopted by reference in the 
Court's Memorandum (.Id. at p. 14). 
Further, the Memorandum Decision and Proposed Order require 
clarification as to what other activities tangentially or 
directly referring to a religious deity might violate the Court's 
Order. For example, would the performance of Handel's Hallelujah 
Chorus or 3eethoven's Ninth Symphony or other Christmas Carols or 
hymns in the City and County Building be a "prayer" in violation 
of the Court's Order? 
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The Memorandum Decision and Proposed Order also appears to 
impinge on the Council's statutory power to issue subpoenas and 
take evidence as a legislative body. (Section 10-3-510, Utah 
Code Ann.) Oaths under Utah law contain statements asking "God" 
to assist the witness in telling the truth. (See Sections 78-24-
17 and 18, U.C.A.: Rule 30(e) U.R.C.P. ; and, Rule 503, Utah Rules 
of Evidence.) Under the broad reach of the Memorandum Decision 
and the Proposed Order these oaths may be construed as "prayers", 
thus subjecting the Council to possible contempt sanctions. 
Rule 65A, the maxims of equity, fundamental fairness and 
elementary due process require that orders which may subject 
persons to contempt must be sufficiently clear to allow them to 
know what conduct is proscribed and prohibited. 3y not defining 
"prayer" the Memorandum Decision and Proposed Order fail this 
test. Further, the lack of a definition of prohibited "prayer" 
inhibits the defendants from determining whether or not to appeal 
the Court's decision and makes any eventual appellate review more 
difficult. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION VIOLATE 
COUNCIL MEMBERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Because the Court has interpreted this suit to be against 
the Council Members, individually, the plaintiffs Proposed Order 
violates the "Speech and Debate" privilege of the Council 
Members. As drafted, the Order would prohibit Council Members 
during debate from uttering personal prayers, other references to 
a deity or, if they were so inclined, from uttering profanities. 
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For the same reasons, the Proposed Order violates the 
Council Members' individual First Amendment rights of Free Speech 
and Freedom of Religion by prohibiting them from uttering their 
own personal prayers during City Council meetings. In order to 
avoid contempt the City Council Members would also be required, 
under the terms of the Proposed Order, to actively ensure that no 
other person in the audience at City Council meetings recited 
prayers. As an example of the unclarity of the Proposed Order, 
would the City Council's Sergeant at Arms be required to eject 
from the meeting a citizen sitting in the back row of a Council 
meeting quietly performing the Rosary or reciting the "Lord's 
Prayer"? 
The Proposed Order and Memorandum Decision also violate the 
equal protection rights of Council Members. Merely by their 
status as a Council Member they would be prohibited from engaging 
in activities clearly within their individual First Amendment 
rights of free speech and freedom of religion. Such 
discrimination involving the denial of the exercise of 
fundamental constitutional rights cannot be justified. 
The Proposed Order is overbroad and violates the Freedom of 
Speech and Religion provisions of both the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Sections I and 4 of Article I of 
the Utah Constitution. The Order is not narrowly tailored to 
serve an important governmental purpose and includes, within its 
scope, protected free speech. As such, the Order would itself be 
unconstitutional under tiie required strict scrutiny standard. 
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Content based restrictions, such as this Court's Memorandum 
Decision and any Order eventually implementing the decision, 
"will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling 
governmental interest." United States v. Grace, 451 U.S. 171, 
177 (1983). If a proposed restriction on speech is based on the 
communicative impact of the speech, the regulation must be 
examined by the courts with "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos 
v. Barrv, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The Proposed Order and Memorandum Decision are ambiguous, 
overbroad, infringe upon Constitutional protections and fail to 
comply with the standards for an injunction under Rule 55A(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court should 
clarify its Memorandum Decision and any Order granting summary 
judgment should reflect the following: 
A. The Decision and Order should apply only against the 
officially adopted Council policy and prayers given as part of 
the official Opening Ceremonies; it should not apply against 
individual Council Members or third parties' speech outside the 
parameters of that Opening Ceremony; 
B. The Order and Decision should define "prayer" with 
sufficient specificity so that the Council members might not 
accidentally violate the Order by giving or allowing an Opening 
Ceremony event which might be characterized as "prayer"; 
C. The Order and Decision should itemize and specify which 
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elements of the City Council policy (Exhibit "0") are prohibited 
as "prayer" and which are allowed as protected speech; and 
D. The Decision and Order should expressly exclude the 
giving of evidentiary oaths; the performance of holiday and/or 
patriotic music; and the reading of historic documents, such as 
the Preamble to the Utah Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence. 
DATED this If day of March, 199^ 2. 
s<i,„ ^ / J: ^ - ^
 r 
ROGER ?< CUTLERS ^ — 
City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
BRUCE R. 3AIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
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Kendell, Legal Counsel for American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation of Utah, Inc., Amicus Curiae, Boston 3uilding #419, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the U.S. 
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Assistant City Attorney 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
SCCrSTY OF SSPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-orofit corporation; 
RZC'd^RD ANDREWS; and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HCRRCCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, RCSSLYN KIRK and 
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?ROPCSZD ORDER GRANTING 
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MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
OF MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Civil No. 910905135 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
MOTION AND OBJECTION 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504(3) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration die defendants hereby object to the Proposed Order 
Granting Summary Judgment mailed by plaintiffs' counsel on March 
o, 1992.l Further, the defendants move the Court for a 
?*?-* 
cia. .cation of its Memorandum Decision of March 2, 1992. 
LThe plaintiffs' counsel inadvertently omitted page 3 from 
the Proposed Order when ~z was originally sent to tne defendants 
The complete ?roposad Order was received by the iefandants on 
Marcn id, 1992. (A copy of tne Proposed Order is attached as 
Sxriibit "A". } 
II. 
GROUNDS 
The Objection and Motion are made on the following grounds: 
1. The Proposed Order and the Memorandum Decision do not 
comply with Rule o5A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Due 
Process in that they do not provide the defendants with 
sufficient guidance so that they will not accidentiy violate the 
Court's Order; 
2. Neither the Memorandum Decision nor the Proposed Order 
defines the prohibited activity of "prayer" so that the Council 
can reasonably be advised of what acts are enjoined; 
3. The Proposed Order improperly restricts the activities 
of individual Council Members and prohibits or chills speech 
protected under both the Utah and Federal Constitutions; 
4. The Proposed Order violates the Council Members' "Speech 
and Debate" immunity and their rights of equal protection; and 
5. The proposed Order may restrict the legislative 
investigatoriai powers of the Council to investigate and receive 
evidence, under oath. 
III. 
SUPPORT 
Grounds in support of this Objection and Motion are mora 
fully specified in the accompanying Memorandum. 
IV. 
R5LIS? SOUGHT 
vvHEREFORS, defendants pray that the Cour4: should clarify its 
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Memorandum Decision and any Order granting summary judgment; they 
should reflect the following: 
A. The Decision and Order should apply only against 
official Council policy and actions, and not against individual 
Council Members or third parties' speech; 
B. The Order and Decision should define "prayer" with 
sufficient specificity so that the Council Members might not 
accidentally violate the Order; 
C. The Order and Decision should itemize and specify which 
elements of the City Council policy (Exhibit "0") are prohibited 
as "prayer"; and 
D. The Decision and Order should expressly exclude the 
giving of evidentiary oaths; the performance of holiday and/or 
patriotic music; and the reading of historic documents, such as 
the Preamble to the Utah Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence. 
DATED this // day of March, 19-9-2-.—'; 
ROGER 5\ CUTL2R 
City Attorney 
3R3CZ R. 3AIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Foundation of Utah, Inc., Amicus Curiae, Boston 3uilding r419, 
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Civil No. 91-090-5135 CV 
(Hon. J.O. FREDERICK) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER Slaving coma befora "ha Court 
for hearing on February 21, 1992 on the parries' mutual 
motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs being represented by 
3rian M. 3amard and defendants being represented by Roger 
Cutler, "ha Court having reviewed the file and all of -ha 
pLeadings "herein, "ha matter having 'z&^n argued and 
submitted and the oourt now being fully advised in the 
premises, based upon the facts and reasoning set ou: in 
plaintiffs' memoranda and in the Court's Memorandum Decision 
of March 2, 1992, there being no substantial material facts 
in dispute, 
IT IS ZZRZ3V ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is denied; further, 
IT 15 KER£3y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is granted; further, 
IT 13 HERZ3y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a 
declaratory judgment to tine effect that the past expenditures 
of funds by defendants and the use of City resources in 
support of prayers at City Council meetings and the practice 
of defendants and Salt LaJca City in having or allowing 
prayers to be recited at meetings of the Salt LaJce City 
Council violate Art- I, 5 4 of the Utah. Constitution; 
further, 
IT 13 HZRE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants, their agents and employees are hereby permanently 
proaibited and enjoined from allowing or having prayers 
recited at meetings of the Salt Hajca City Council and they 
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are permanently enjoined and prohibited from appending public 
funds, resources or property to support or ar.couraga such 
prayars; further, 
IT IS HZRI3? ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DSCHEZD that the 
plaintiffs ara awarded a judgment against defendants for 
plaintiffs' court costs incurred in this matter in the sum of 
one hundred three dollars (3103.00). 
DATED this day of yj-3.CZ, 1992. 
3? THE COURT: 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUDGE 
3 
CERTIFICATE o? SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be sailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMHARY JUDGMENT 
to: 
ROGER CUTLER £ 3RCJCE 3AIRD 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SA1T LAX2 CITY ATTORNEYS 
SALT LAKE CITY £ COUNTY 3UILDING 
WASHINGTON SQUkRZ 
Salt Lake City, titan 34ill 
KATHRYN SENDELL 
STAFF COUNSEL 
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LI3ERTIES 
UNION FOUNDATION Or UTAH, INC. 
303TON 3UILDING £ 419 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
an the STH day of MARCH, 1992, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
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SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit corporation; 
RICHARD ANDREWS; and J. WALKER, 
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vs 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Civil No. 910906136 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
CITY LEGISLATORS DO NOT HAVE THEIR RIGHTS OF 
FREE EXPRESSION COMPROMISED BY VIRTUE OF 
THEIR ELECTED STATUS OR ACTING AS CITY 
COUNCIL MEMBERS. 
On March 17, 1992, the unpleasant fall-out from the Court's 
Memorandum Decision was in full display. Brent Richards, an 
elected Councilman of Riverton City, appeared before Salt Lake 
City's legislative body to protest the Court's Memorandum 
Decision, state his view on freedom of speech rights of Council 
Members and urge an appeal of the Court's Decision. As part of 
that presentation, he undertook a protest statement by beginning 
a prayer. He was abruptly interrupted by the Chair of the Salt 
Lake City Council and, when he protested, was forcibly ejected 
from the Council Chambers by the Police Sergeant-at-arms. (See 
Affidavit of Deputy City Recorder, Chris Meeker.) 
• Council Chair Hardman's response was, admittedly, premature 
in that the Order, implementing the Court's Decision, had not 
been executed. However, it serves as a pointed illustration of 
the ugly consequences of the Order, as proposed by Plaintiffs'. 
In legal sophistry that escapes the common-man, with his innate 
sense of justice, and escapes the reason of even those learned in 
the law, we appear to have reached the absurdity that one can 
appear on public property and burn the American flag, with 
protected constitutional speech, but be gagged for rendering a 
prayful protest utterance. 
Plaintiffs' reply asserts that such a consequence is 
mandated by reverence for this newly discovered "fundamental" 
constitutional right, which has lain dormant and undiscovered for 
almost a hundred years. Plaintiffs' counsel, further, makes the 
startling justification that his proposed broad order that 
enjoins the free speech rights of individual Council members and 
prevents them from even "encouraging" prayer on public property 
(applicable to their private "employees") is a sacrifice stemming 
from their election. (See Plaintiffs' Reply Memo dated March 18, 
1992 at pg. 8.) 
No authority is cited for this extraordinary declaration 
and, indeed, no authority citation could be made. The writer is 
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aware of only one Utah rationale, which would support such a 
position. That is the much maligned position of Justice Ellott, 
declaring that Utah need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court 
dictates on the Fourth Amendment because the Fourteenth had not 
been validly executed. The Justice's infamous argument that we 
need no "Mapp" to guide us and that the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be invalid against states has brought much ridicule to the 
state and the state's judiciary. [See, generally, State v. 
Richards, 489 P.2d 422 (Utah 1971), Dvett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1968)]. 
The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution is alive and 
well in Utah. Further, for the reasons under the authorities 
previously cited in the Plaintiffs' memorandum, the First 
Amendment and the State's free speech provisions require strict 
scrutiny, narrowly tailored orders and regulations, when the 
content of speech is to be prescribed. Regardless of the scope 
of Plaintiffs' now asserted intent, that intent does not reflect 
itself in the proposed Order. Without repeating the previous 
observations about vagueness, overbreadth and ambiguity, the 
chilling impact of is illustrated by the expulsion of Council 
Member Richards. 
One must question how the Plaintiffs and the amicus Civil 
Liberties Union will react when their political opponents and 
those having different ideology seek to have government attorneys 
use such an oppressive order as a sword. One can readily 
envision such a request being made on Civil Rights Day, and day's 
,3 
of criminal executions, when it is traditional to have a "prayer 
vigil", with the burning of candles and prayers, for those 
respective causes. 
After nearly twenty five years of public sector practice, 
the writer can affirmatively declare that an Ordinance drafted 
with the overbreadth and vagueness and chilling prior restraint 
that is finally evident in the Plaintiffs' Proposed Order would 
bring Civil Rights challenges like seagulls to the city dump. 
And rightfully so. Having been drawn into this thicket, it is 
respectfully submitted that the Court should decline to step 
deeper into the swampy quicksand by enjoining the expressive 
rights of these individual Council members. 
Plaintiffs and their counsel, should not be left to guess or 
speculate as to the Court's meaning of "prayer" or what is 
prohibited. Governments should not have to defend a second tier 
of suit seeking to prohibit prayer vigils, and other forms of 
expression. 
If the Court is committed to break ranks with the Tenth 
Circuit in Anderson and the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas, by 
reading Article I §4 to be something different than an 
establishment provision, it ought to do so with an judicial 
scalpel and not the meat axe handed it by Plaintiffs. 
II. 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "0" IS A WRITTEN 
STATEMENT OF COUNCIL POLICY AND NOT A POST 
HOC ADOPTION, FOLLOWING THE LAWSUIT. 
Plaintiffs have suggested a Council action which was adopted 
4 
following the lawsuit. Statement is materially misleading. The 
following chronology is of record: 
1. Plaintiffs7 counsel addressed a letter to the Mayor 
demanding that the City Council discontinue its invocation 
policy, September 12, 1991. 
2. The matter was duly referred to the Council by the 
Mayor, as a separate and equal branch of government. The Council 
debated and prepared a written discussion draft of this pre-
existing and policy; a copy of which was forwarded to Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Mr. Barnard, on September 25, 1991. The Council meeting 
for consideration was identified as October 4, 1991. 
3. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit September 26, 1991, at 
approximately 3:51 p.m., apparently in response to the Council 
draft. 
4. None of the Plaintiffs or Mr. Barnard appeared before 
the Council, submitted any response or made any objections to the 
City Council concerning the proposed written policy. The City 
Council vigorously debated the proposed policy and adopted it on 
a 5 to 2 vote on October 17, 1991. 
The City Council policy reflected, in writing, preexisting 
practice and rationale. The Plaintiffs' assertion and suggestion 
of a post filing creation is not supported by the record. In 
point of fact, it was Plaintiffs who apparently rushed to the 
court house in an attempt to beat the deliberative democratic 
process, in the Councils' reevaluation of its policy and 
formalizing it in written form. 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF 
SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council 
Defendants. 
-^12.-9 a-sen cJw, 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 91-090-6136 CV 
(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
for hearing on February 21, 1992 on the parties' mutual 
motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs being represented by 
Brian M. Barnard and defendants being represented by Roger 
Cutler, the Court having reviewed the file and all of the 
pleadings therein, the matter having been argued and 
submitted and the court now being fully advised in the 
premises, based upon the facts and reasoning set out in 
plaintiffs' memoranda and in the Court's Memorandum Decision 
of March 2, 1992, there being no substantial material facts 
in dispute, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is denied; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is granted; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a 
declaratory judgment to the effect that the past expenditures 
of funds by defendants and the use of City resources in 
support of prayers at City Council meetings and the practice 
of defendants and Salt Lake City in having or allowing 
prayers to be recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City 
Council violate Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution; 
further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
defendants, their agents and employees are hereby permanently 
prohibited and enjoined from allowing or having prayers 
recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City Council and they 
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are permanently enjoined and prohibited from expending public 
funds, resources or property to support or encourage such 
prayers; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiffs are awarded a judgment against defendants for 
plaintiffs' court costs incurred in this matter in the sum of 
one hundred three dollars ($103.00). 
DATED this ^^day of 4Mffi§H, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
to: 
ROGER CUTLER & BRUCE BAIRD 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEYS 
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING 
WASHINGTON SQUARE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KATHRYN KENDELL 
STAFF COUNSEL 
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION FOUNDATION OF UTAH, INC. 
BOSTON BUILDING #419 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 6TH day of MARCH, 1992, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 






Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the 
people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles 
of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION. 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty - No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The 
State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall 
be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or 
for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or 
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or hold 
office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
ARTICLE III 
ORDINANCE 
[Religious toleration - Polygamy forbidden.] 
First: - Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is 
guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested 
in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited. 
